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But as Huizenga wrote, ". . . one can legitimately ask whether the wish is not father to the thought with those. who accuse their country of a misuse of its power, whcther it is not tlicir aversion from the power ganic which makes them dcmy the need to join in it an tlic Asiatic front."
It is evident that hlcGeorge Bundy was overly optimistic in his essay, "The End of Either/Or" (Foreign Affairs, January, 1967) . In that piece the former S1)eciiil Assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson assumed it was generally agreed that "we need both military rind economic action" in Vietnam and elsewlicw; "we are both am Atlantic and a Pacific partner"; and finally, "we have a still more sweeping double. duty: to carry on both these wide foreign activiticls and an active program of social progress at home." Although President Nixon and his Special Assistant Henry Kissinger seem generally to agree with Bundy's anidysis and prescription, it is evident that many actors and observers do not. Hans Morgenthau, both a leading academic expert on world poIitics and a bitter foe oi this nation's role in Vietnam March, 1969 . )
The dreadful possibility of nuclear war, the limited and awful Wiir in Vietnam, and domestic problems have led the critics mentioned above to develop several basic themes in their appeal for greater concentration upon domestic affairs and a reduction in American commitments abroad. "Globalism," they argue, is simply the opposite extreme of America's historic isolationist tradition. IVhcreiis this country improperly refused to exercise its responsibility a s a great power during the 1920s and 1930's, since the second world war it hils gotten involved on all the continents. It has been acting as "global policeman" axid architect of ; i "global Great Society." America's lei1dcrs have failed to realize the truth of D. M7.
Brogan's concept of "The Illusions of American Omnipotence" ( Hnrper's, December, 1962). Moreover, Anierica, with all its domestic ills and injustices, has nevertheless acted as "self-righteous" guarantor of the "free world." And this pursuit of "world order," especially by the Kennedy and Johnson. Adniinistrations, has developed at a time when the threat from both the Soviet Union and Communist China has declined. Polycentrism within the Communist movement and nationalism in the Third World have rendered the "global" approach of American foreign policy both unnecessary and "unethical."
Hnris Jiorgenthau puts the main thrust of the One can agree in part with those critics who attack the ''globalist" and Messianic aspects of postwar American foreign policy, even if one thinks that they often niistnke rhetoric for action. But reflection suggests that their understandable fear of nuclear war and their fury over America's Vietnam invol\~ement vitiates both their analysis and their prescription of neo-isolationism. It is past time for "The End of ISither/Or." America has no choice between power and development politics abroad, and it has no choice between concentrating primarily on domestic or foreign policy. The world environment will continue to be turbulent for the remainder of this century. Carleton concludes his discussion of the question cited above, "Were Americans Prepared for World Leadership?" with the following questions: "Would the Americans see the world crisis through? Would they dare to do otherwise? How successful would their leadership be?" He is, like all other students of American foreign policy, critical of various aspects of this nation's effort over the last quarter of a century. But he concludes his book by predicting ''. . . the American Presence (in world affairs) would likely increase rather than diminish during the closing decades of the twentieth century." It remains to be seen, of course. But rational analysis suggests that if the emotional backlash to Vietnam and legitimate concern with pressing domestic problems combine to produce a significant decline in America's presence, neither this country's "primary" nor "'secondary" interests would be served. Hopefully, the Nixon Administration and public opinion will not be heavily influenced by the arguments of the neo-isolationists. I had been in Cuba only four days when this question was asked me, just after services the second morning of Rosh Hashanah, by the baa1 tefilah of the Sephardic congregation in the Vedado section of Habana, a gentle-voiced man whose kaoanuh had impressed me during the services and whose question now sharply challenged me. Its challenge was due partly to the man who posed it, obviously a dedicated and involved Jew, and partly to what I had already seen and felt in and around Habana: a vitality of spirit, a dedication to the welfare and education of youth, and a cooperation and sharing which I had Zelt elsewhere only in Israel.
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HOLY DAYS IN HABANA
The question was, on reflection, somewhat surprising as well. Cuba, after all, purports to be a Commu-, nist experiment, and we all associate communism with an anti-religious orientation which is sometimes, as in the case of the Soviet Union, anti-Jewish as well. I had heard that Cuba was different, as indeed it turned out to be, but at that point I had not yet fully grasped to what an extent it is its own independent social experiment, with special features and particular qualities not found elsewhere. As I was quickly to discover, however, these directly affect the Jewish situation and make of it also something quite unusual.
There are, for example, still functioning in Habana, despite the departure of nearly 9, OOO of its pre-revolutionary 10, OOO Jews, the five congregations which existed in 1958; three in Vedado, a coastal section of Habana with some luxury hotels, quite a few high-rise apartments and many fine homes; and two in Old Habana, the port and commercial section of the city
